DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 181 517 CS 502 792

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TITLE The Theory of Expression in Selected Eighteenth-Century Rhetorics 1.
PUB DATE [79]
NOTE 33p.; Essay prepared at Syracuse University.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Audiences; *Communication (Thought Transfer); *Eighteenth Century Literature; Emotional Response; Fine Arts; *Intellectual History; Literary History; Nonverbal Communication; Philosophy; *Rhetoric; *Self Expression; *Theories

ABSTRACT

The expressionist theory of rhetoric, as presented in critical passages of selected eighteenth century texts, is examined in this essay. The introductory section of the essay discusses historical attitudes toward the relationship between grammar, logic, and rhetoric and points to the emergence and wide acceptance during the eighteenth century of expressive theories of art that justified the union of rhetoric with the fine arts. Subsequent sections examine passages from eighteenth century texts in the context of assumptions of the intellectual community of that century concerning the following areas: the interaction of mind and body; the significance of nonverbal communication, or "natural signs," in the expression of emotion; and the way in which the quality of verbal and nonverbal forms of expression affects the emotional reactions of an audience. The essay concludes by noting that the treatment of the classical rhetorical canons during the closing decades of the eighteenth century was fully consistent with the expressionist attitude and by telling how rhetoric rapidly became an object of opprobrium during the nineteenth century as the assumptions supporting the expressionist theory lost their popularity. (GT)

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THE THEORY OF EXPRESSION IN SELECTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY RHETORICS 1

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Aristotle declared Rhetoric to be the "counterpart of Dialectic," and thereby fostered a tradition maintaining that Rhetoric is an art of composition closely related to Grammar and Logic. The scholastic curriculum uniting Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric as the Trivium was the most immediate extension of this tradition, but even writers who have sought to liberate mankind from the Aristotelian legacy retain taxonomies treating Rhetoric, Logic, and Grammar as proximately related arts. For example, the impact of Ramus' reforms was to eliminate redundancy among the arts so that comprehensive preparation for discourse required instruction in all three. 2 Similarly, Francis Bacon reduced knowledge to four intellectual arts: inquiry, examination, custody, and tradition. Rhetoric proper is located within tradition, and the division which establishes its boundaries repeats the order of the trivium. Tradition is broken into the organ of discourse, the subject of Grammar; the method of discourse, the object of Logic; and the illumination of discourse, the province of Rhetoric. 3 Bacon's taxonomy proved extremely popular during the eighteenth century, 4 and even overshadowed Thomas Hobbes' more systematic approach. However, Hobbes' system also predicates a substantial union between the arts of discourse. 5

These classifications and the use of the generic phrases "arts of composition" and "arts of discourse" reflect the belief that the characteristics shared by Logic, Rhetoric, and Grammar are fundamental attributes.

Historically, definitions of the discursive arts have specified differentia which mark the boundaries of each while assuming that the shared attributes are fundamental to all three. These fundamental attributes generally are said to be use of language and appeal to mental processes associated with reason. Appeals to passions and emotions have been regarded as secondary or nondefining characteristics by most theorists.

As our recent predecessors and contemporaries have studied the history of Rhetoric, its putative relationship with Logic and Grammar have assumed an axiomatic character determining the materials worthy of examination and stipulating the manner in which definitional statements are to be interpreted. The accepted version of this axiom is evident in Charles Sears Baldwin's claim that "the relations of rhetoric to grammar on the one hand and to logic on the other must be considered in determining its function at any period in its history" and that "the estimate of the rhetoric . . . of a given period must consider the contemporary view of the whole Trivium." 6 References to this axiom and instances of its application are easy to multiply, 7 and much of the history of rhetoric has been told by characterizing its relationships to Logic and Grammar in various periods. This approach has facilitated examination of materials reflecting the dominant rhetorical tradition. However, it has also resulted in inattention to [illegible] of materials which stand outside that tradition. This

failing is particularly evident in studies of Enlightenment Rhetoric because theorists of this period considered systems of classification to be problematic and explored several alternatives. 8 Most of the taxonomies produced retain the close association between the arts of discourse, but an important variant dissociates Rhetoric from its traditional sister arts. This variant consists of grouping Rhetoric with the plastic arts under the title, "fine arts," and an adequate account of this development has yet to be produced. For theorists who identified Rhetoric as a fine art, 9 comparisons to Logic and Grammar were uninstructive and irrelevant. More was to be learned, they believed, by exploring the similarities between Rhetoric and Music, Drama, and plastic arts such as Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture. The characteristic these diverse arts were said to share was EXPRESSION, and theorists of this ilk were committed to expressive theories of art which justify the Union of Rhetoric with the fine arts. 10 This is an important transition because it represents a redefintion of Rhetoric substituting the act of expression for the use of language as the generic feature of Rhetoric. Of course, earlier theorists such as Cicero had recognized expression of emotions as an accompaniement of discourse, but none prior to the eighteenth century had made such expression the ultimate purpose or defining attribute of the art.

The emergence of expressive theories of poetry has long been recognized as the hallmark of the Romantic movement, and M. H. Abrams identifies the year 1800 as "a good round number . . . by which to signalize the displacement of mimetic and pragmatic by the expressive view of art in English criticism." 11 However, the antecedents of this development are evident in several rhetorical theories of the preceding century, and many rhetoricians based their understanding of the art upon comparisons with the other arts of expression. For example, Cockin's Art of Delivering Written Language (1775) notes that there is something in Music which affects the hearer beyond measure and then explains:

> In practical music this commanding particular is called Expression; and as we find certain tones analogous to it frequently coalescing with the modulations of the voice which indicate our passions and affections (thereby more particularly pointing out the meaning of what we say) the term is usually applied in the same sense to speaking and reading. 12

Cockin's praise for the expressive powers of Rhetoric are commonplace and I find it remarkable that historians have not fully examined the significance of the doctrine of expression for eighteenth-century rhetorics. Curiously, the doctrine is scarcely mentioned in the standard histories of the subject, and histories of the fine arts during this period seldom comment on the growing association between Rhetoric and the fine arts. 13 I believe this phenomena has been overlooked in part because it stands outside the

accepted frame of reference employed in describing Rhetoric and partly because the theory of expression was not articulated in a single document prior to the start of the nineteenth century.

The fact that the doctrine received no single, comprehensive statement does not imply that it was not influential. Comprehensive articulation followed several decades during which theoretical possibilities were explored and the constituents of the final theory were worked out in theoretical isolation from purely aesthetic concepts. The speculations which I believe became constituents of the comprehensive theory of expression include the Cartesian mind-body distinction the postulated interaction between these elements, generally accepted claims about natural language, and moral theories emphasizing the role of emotion and sentiment in producing belief and arousing action. Although these constituents were not formally combined in print prior to the nineteenth century, 14 they were widely circulated and carefully articulated by philosophers who had little interest in Rhetoric, per se, but who so shaped the intellectual climate of the era that no theorist was immune to their influence. Moreover, by the midpoint of the eighteenth century, these constituents had been discussed in such an array of semipopular writings that no member of the literary public could miss even off-handed references to them, and most readers would recognize their implications for Rhetoric even when unstated. I believe these

constituents of expressionist theory were widely accepted and altered the intellectual climate of the era. Traditional statements about Rhetoric lost their cogency and the resulting Rhetoric of expression was part and parcel of the emerging Romantic movement. This essay describes the Rhetoric of Expression by displaying the manner in which critical passages of selected texts were probably read by members of the eighteenth-century intellectual community.

MIND-BODY INTERACTION

The root meaning of "express" is to "press out" or "squeeze out," and uses of the verb to refer to artistic or linguistic phenomena are metaphorically derived from mechanical applications. 15 By the middle of the sixteenth century, critics had begun to regard paintings as unique expressions of artists views of the world. 16 However, the modern theory of expression de-emphasizes the implied portraiture of the Renaissance theory, and concentrates on display of mental phenomena. M. H. Abrams notes this characteristic in the following terms.

> In general terms, the central tendency of the expressive theory may be summarized in this way: A work of art is essentially the internal made external, resulting from a creative process operating under the impulse of feeling, and embodying the combined product of [,for example,] the poet's perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. The primary source and subject matter of a poem, therefore, are the attributes and actions of the poet's own mind; or if aspects of the external world, then these only as they are converted from

> fact to poetry by the feelings and operations of the poet's mind. 17

Systematic development of expression as an aesthetic concept in this modern sense required careful distinction between internal and external phenomena. Prior to the seventeenth century, these phenomena "were so blended together that it was impossible to say where the one ends and the other begins," 18 and Descartes' distinction between mind and body furnished the essential foundation for subsequent theorists. Descartes observed that mind and body appear to share no common attributes and may be conceptually distinguished from one another on that basis. Moreover, he said, the essential or defining attribute of each is different and this fact justifies maintaining that they are radically different sorts of existence. He wrote:

> But although any one attribute is sufficient to give us a knowledge of substance, there is always one principal property of substance which constitutes its nature and essence, and on which all the others depend. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. For all else that may be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is but a mode of this extended thing; as everything that we find in mind is but so many diverse forms of thinking. Thus, for example, we cannot conceive figure but as an extended thing, nor movement but as an extended space; so imagination, feeling, and will, only exist in a thinking thing. 19

While the concepts, mind and body, could be distinguished from one another, it was obvious to most theorists that neither actually exist independent of the other. This fact gave rise to a secondary problem of

determining the relationship between these forms of existence. Several alternatives were explored. Hobbes and Hartley maintained that mental phenomena are merely particular consequences of physical activity while Berkley and Hume argued that physical objects are mere illusions resulting from the mind's attention to its ideas. Neither of these extremes were widely accepted, and most members of the literary public agreed with Thomas Reid's assessment: denying the uniqueness of mind and body is absurd and an affront to common sense. The popular view was that mind and body exist simultaneously in each person and that these two aspects of the individual are in a constant state of interaction. Support for this view was found in the fact that mental phenomena produce physical changes--as embarrassment produces a red face--and physical events such as illness affect mental processes. This combination of mental and physical aspects of man was seen to be an unavoidable consequence of human nature which could not be fully explained, but which had important consequences for the fine arts. The pleasures of the soul, Montesquieu argued, are distinct from those of the body and the perfection of art consists in manipulating physical representations to give maximum pleasure to the soul. He wrote:

> The way in which we are constituted is entirely arbitrary. We could have been made as we are or differently; but if we had been made differently, we would have felt differently; an organ more or less in our machine would have produced a new eloquence, a new poetry; a different make-up of the same organs would have produced still another

kind of poetry. 20

Use of physical representations to express mental phenomena was made possible by the interaction between mind and body, and this fact was seen to be the distinctive characteristic of the fine arts. Mark Akenside described the faculties of aesthetic perception as "certain powers which seem to hold a middle place between the organs of bodily sense and the faculties of moral perception," 21 and his argument echoed Joseph Addison's claim that "the pleasures of the imagination, . . . are not so gross as those of sense, nor as refined as those of the understanding." 22 Thomas Reid capitalized on the distinction betweeen mind and body and their supposed interaction to order his entire theory of knowledge and art.

> The sciences divide into two grand branches[.] One that is employed about mater [sic] and another that is employed about mind. But as these two objects matter and mind have certain connections and relations one to the other . . .; so there is a large branch of human knowledge founded upon these connexions[sic]. And to this branch belongs all that is scientific in the fine arts. 23

Classifications such as those of Akenside, Addison, and Reid had important implications for all of the arts of expression, but they also produced two consequences which seem unique to Rhetoric. First, some writers recognized the interaction between mind and body in the presentation of effective messages. Du Bos maintained that the "chief merit of a declaimer, is to move himself" because "the internal

emotion of a speaker throws a pathos into his tone and gesture which neither art nor study are able to produce." 24 Of course, anticipations of this belief include a number of classical sources such as Cicero, Quintilian, and Horace. However, simple attribution overlooks the special currency given the doctrine by eighteenth-century theories of human nature.

The second unique consequence of these taxonomies resulted from their conjunction with analysis of human sensory apparatus. Perception was taken to be a process in which each sensory modality produced distinct mental contents. Locke and the empiricists called these contents "ideas" or, in Hume's detailed analysis, "ideas and impressions." Reid and kindred theorists prefered to call such contents "conceptions." In both cases, an auditor's response to art was understood to depend on the mental contents created by his perception of the object. And, the number and impact of the contents created was seen to be a function of the number of sensory modalities addressed. In this regard, eloquence was believed to be pre-eminent because the number of sensory modalities invoked by the speaker gave him unrivaled access to the mind of his auditor. "There is no earthly object," James Burgh maintained, "capable of making such various, and such forcible impressions upon the human mind, as the consummate speaker." 25

NATURAL SIGNS

The second component of the emerging expression theory of art resulted from analyses of linguistic signification. Language was seen to be an image of the mind and figurative speech was seen to be particularly indicative of an individual's feelings. Josepy Priestley aptly summarized the emerging theory in the following passage.

> Figurative speech . . . is indicative of a person's real feelings and state of mind, not by means of the words it consists of, considered as signs of separate ideas, and interpreted according to their common acceptation; but as circumstances naturally attending those feelings which compose any state of mind. Those figurative expressions, therefore, are scarce considered and attended to as words, but are viewed in the same light as attitudes, gestures, and looks, which are infinitely more expressive of sentiments and feelings than words can possibly be. 26

Words were taken to be "artificial signs," and many writers were fascinated by the relationship between mental images and linguistic signs. However, an even more significant development was systematic attention to nonverbal forms of expression. Francis Bacon had observed that the "lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition and inclination of the mind in general [and that] . . . the countenance and parts . . . do further disclose the present humour and state of the mind and will." 27 Bacon was confident that the correspondence between physical features and mental dispositions "was no less comprehensible by art" than other phenomena, but believed that then current learning was deficient and marked this as an area for further study.

Coincidentally, DesCartes observed that inherited lore concerning the passions was defective, 28 and the combined recommendations of Bacon and DesCartes were sufficient to call forth a number of efforts to catalogue the emotions and to describe their effects. Although of limited theoretic interest, such catalogues were well received and provided the materials with which subsequent rhetoricians worked. The following passage illustrates the tone of such works.

> ADMIRATION is a surprize [sic], which makes the Mind consider with Attention those Objects which seem rare and extraordinary: And this Surprize is sometimes so strong, as to drive the Spirits towards the place from whence the Impression of the Object is received; and being so much imployed [sic] in considering this Impression, that there remain no Sprits to pass through the Muscles, the Body thereby becomes immoveable as a Statue. 29

Such descriptions were not taken lightly. The treatise from which this illustration is taken includes 43 carefully executed engravings illustrating the effects of the various emotions and a description of the physiological processes associated with each.

Theoretical structures of the period offered few opportunities for expansion of the theory of signs, and only Thomas Reid produced a systematic theory of knowledge based on the doctrine. However, there was general agreement concerning the elements of the human constitution which had potential for signification. James Burgh maintained that "every part of the human frame contributes to express the passions and emotions of the mind," 30 while other

theorists offered more precise enumerations. For example, Henry Home, Lord Kames, began by distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary signs, and further subdivided voluntary signs into arbitrary and natural varieties. Signs of the countenance were divided into those which are "temporary, making their appearance with the emotions that produce them, and vanish with these emotions," and permanent signs which display long-term dispositions or tempers. All involuntary signs were said to be natural and the enumeration includes tones of voice, "attitudes or gestures that naturally accompany certain emotions," and expressions "displayed upon the countenance" such as smiling and frowning. 31

Signs of this type were said to be "natural" and the adjective carries a double sense in the prevalent descriptions. On the one hand, it was used to distinguish signs of this type from those of human invention. In this sense, natural signs are contrasted with words which are called "arbitrary" or "instituted," and with writing which is said to be even further removed from natural processes. On the other hand, "nature" was said to be the active agent in composing such signs. "Nature," Burgh explained, "has given to every emotion of the mind its proper outward expression." 32 Theories of natural endowment took two forms: a weak version evidenced by Condillac and a strong version generally associated with advocates of the philosophy of Common Sense. According to the weaker

version, the capacity for signification is incidental to human nature and the expressive capacity arises from the fact that all individuals are constituted according to the same principles. Individuals learn to recognize natural signs in the activities of others through experience with their own physiological processes. This position was espoused by Condillac as a means of explaining language without resorting to innate ideas.

> This language is natural to all individuals of the same species; nevertheless, all need to learn it. It is natural to them, because if a man who has not the use of words shows with a gesture the object he needs, and expresses by other motions the desire that his object gives birth to in him, it is, . . . a result of his constitution. But if this man had not observed what his body does in such a case, he would not have learned to recognize the desire in the movements of another. He would not therefore be capable of intentionally doing the like in order to make himself understood. This language is not, therefore, so natural that it is known without being learned. 33

Condillac was forced to adopt this rather complex position as a means of defending Locke's theory of knowledge from the challenge of those who observed the apparent universality of certain linguistic phenomena. The stronger position is less complex because its advocates were unfettered by Locke's dictates. In the stronger view, natural signs are the direct product of natural intervention and their signification is known prior to experience. For Kames, the operation of such signs must be ascribed to "the original constitution of human nature" because their meanings could not be determined from experience. 34 Thomas Reid's position is equally strong and his doctrines are somewhat

more explicit. He described these signs by saying that the "connection between sign and signified is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle, without reasoning or experience." He maintained that all men understand this language without instruction and its operation appears to be akin to reminiscence. The ability to interpret such signs is "latent in the mind." We intuitively recognize them in others and understand their meaning without deliberation. 35

Distinctions between the strong and weak versions of this theory were of minor concern to the rhetoricians of the era because both maintained that such signs were particularly efficacious in the expression of emotion. DuBos explained this characteristic as follows:

> Words must first excite those ideas, whereof they are only arbitrary signs. These ideas must be ranged afterwards in the imagination, and form such pictures as move and engage us. All these operations, 'tis true, are soon done; but it is an uncontestable principle in mechanics, that the multiplicity of springs always debilitates the movement, by reason that one spring never communicates to another all the motion it has received. Besides, one of these operations (that which is performed when the word excites the idea it signifies) is not done by virtue of the laws of nature; but is partly artificial. Those objects therefore, which are exhibited to us . . . by natural signs, must certainly operate with greater expedition. 36

This greater expedition in addressing the emotions was of particular significance to the rhetoricians of the day because prevailing theories of belief and motivation emphasized the role of the passions in directing conduct.

BELIEF AND MOTIVATION

The theory described here viewed material expression of mental phenomena through artificial and natural signs to be the definitive characteristic of Rhetoric and the other fine arts. However, it also recognized that the quality of expressions affects the reactions of an audience. Although the ability to produce audience reaction was not seen to be a characteristic attribute as it was in communicative and pragmatic theories of art, this ability is seen to be a natural attendant of an orator's expressions. Historically, this coincidental association of expression with audience response is important because it helps to explain the transition from classical to romantic theories of discourse.

The significance of expression and emotional arousal in romantic literary theroy is well known, and intrusions of such theory into rhetorical works are regarded with displeasure. Under the influence of Romanticism, Rhetoric is said to have abandoned its interest in pragmatic communication and to have suffered as a consequence. Witness David Kaufer's juxtaposition of classical and romantic theories:

> The views of Classical and Romantic theories approximate the very extremes of ideal types. Ancient theorists--tending to ground rhetoric in transparent cultural norms, identify language with the enforcement of these norms, and neglect the possibilities of language in personal expression--offer a theory of language "locked into" the observer's perspective. Much of Romantic rhetorical theory, on the other hand, carries opacity assumptions to the extreme . . .--leaving it to the single perceiver to

> define rhetorical situations from an idiosyncratic perspective, disparaging the instrumental function of language, and raising self-expression to the highest social art. 37

The neat contrast between instrumental and expressive views of discourse is commonplace, but its applicability to eighteenth-century rhetorics is marred by the failure to recognize that then prevailing theories of human motivation made the appropriate expression of emotion the surest means of accomplishing persuasive objectives.

Marking the connection between moral theory and Rhetoric, Francis Hutcheson argued that "upon this moral Sense is founded all the Power of the orator." 38 Not all theorists subscribed to Hutcheson's particular moral sense theory, and alternatives included the theory of sympathy articulated by Adam Smith, claims of divine inspiration defended by conservative clergy, and the enlightened self-interest advanced by David Hume. 39 However, disagreements between these rival camps concerned the origin of moral disctinctions while the observations used to test each theory were generally accepted. Or, as Hume observed in a cryptic footnote to the Treatise, "there is such uniformity in the general sentiments of mankind, as to render such questions of but small importance." 40 These general sentiments represented a theory of belief and motivation to which most rhetoricians assented and which is evident in their rhetorics. The important tenets of this theory include (i) the belief that the operations of reason

alone are insuffient to explain human nature and conduct; (ii) recognition that under certain conditions observers experience strong emotional responses to the situation of others; (iii) acknowledgement that emotional response is a strong impetus to belief; and (iv) admission that emotional responses are a primary source of action. Collectively, these observations concerning human behavior and motivation imply that appropriate expression of emotion by an orator would cause the hearers to feel a like emotion and to respond as if it were their own. Thomas Sheridan explained such expression by saying that "persuasion is ever its attendant, and the passions own it for a master." 41 G. P. Mohrmann has demonstrated that the presumed persuasive efficacy of expression was "a philosophical justification for the elocutionary theory [and] had widespread currency during the eighteenth century." 42 To his conclusion, we should add recognition that theorists who are not thought of as elocutionists also subscribed to the theory of expression.

Both verbal and nonverbal forms of expression were thought to be capable of arousing the passions. Verbal techniques of expression depend on description of the objects naturally suited to arousing each passion. Hugh Blair's account of this process is particularly well stated.

> To every emotion or passion, Nature has adapted a set of corresponding objects; and, without setting these before the mind, it is not in the power of any Orator to raise that emotion. I am warmed with gratitude, I am touched with

> compassion, not when a Speaker shows me that these are noble dispositions, and that it is my duty to feel them; or when he exclaims against me for my indifference and coldness. All this time, he is speaking only to my reason or conscience. He must describe the kindness and tenderness of my friend; he must set before me the distress suffered by the person for whom he would interest me; then, and not till then, my heart begins to be touched, my grattitude or my compassion begin to flow. The foundation, therefore, of all successful execution in the way of Pathetic Oratory is, to paint the object of that passion which we wish to raise, in the most natural and striking manner; to describe it with such circumstances as are likely to awaken it in the minds of others. 43

George Campbell recognized the persuasive force of both verbal and nonverbal forms of expression.

> A person present with us, whom we see and hear, and who by words, and looks, and gestures, gives the liveliest signs of his feelings, has the surest and most immediate claim upon our sympathy. We become infected with his passions. We are hurried along by them, and not allowed leisure to distinguish between his relation and our relation, his interest and our iterest. 44

The origin of Campbell's theories is a matter of historical controversy, and possible sources of this particular doctrine can be found at both ends of the philosophic spectrum. David Hume observed that "the principles of every sentiment, [are] in every man; and, when touched properly, they rise to life, and warm the heart." 45 Hume's most capable critic, Thomas Reid, explained the persuasive efficacy of expression as follows.

> The great force of Eloquence is chiefly to be resolved into sympathy. We perceive the sentiments and Emotions of the Speaker, & when they appear Just and proper, We are seized with the same by a kind of contagion. As in Musical Chords the Vibration of one produces a similar Vibration in another which is in concord with it: so it is in human Minds. Every passion in the

> Speaker that appears just and proper produces by sympathy a like passion in the hearers. 46

Finally, the significance of expression is apparent in the growing rhetorical interest in sublimity. The sublime was said to transport an individual outside himself, and some rhetoricians believed effective expression overwhelmed the auditor. The following passage describes the anticipated consequences of truely sublime expression.

> True eloquence does not wait for cool approbation. Like irresistable beauty, it transports, it ravishes, it commands the admiration of all, who are within its reach. If it allows us time to criticise [sic] it is not genuine. It ought to hurry us out of ourselves, to engage and swallow up our whole attention; to drive everything out of our minds, besides the subject it would hold forth, and the point, it would carry. The hearer finds himself as unable to resist it, as to blow out a conflagration with the breath of his mouth, or to stop the stream of a river with his hand. His passions are no longer his own. The orator has taken possession of them; and with superior power, works them as he pleases. 47

CONCLUSION

This essay describes a Rhetoric of expression which becomes apparent when selected texts are read in the context of eighteenth-century assumptions concerning human nature and conduct. Although the expressionist aesthetic was not fully formulated until the close of the century, its principle components had been articulated by a number of theorists and provided grounds for classifying Rhetoric with the fine arts. The evidence at hand is too slender to claim

an explicit causal relationship between emergence of the expressionist aesthetic and developing attitudes toward discourse. However, it is clear that some rhetoricians came to regard eloquence as a form of aesthetic expression, and I believe the consequences of this attitude for Rhetoric are evident in two particulars.

First, the treatment of the classical canons during the closing decades of the eighteenth century is fully consistent with the expressionist attitude. Both verbal and nonverbal forms of expression were valued and the canons related to style and delivery flourished. Speculation concerning invention and disposition languished and a rationale for this fact is apparent. As an art of expression, Rhetoric is charged with displaying the thoughts, feelings, emotions, and sentiments which are already present in the mind of an orator. Such mental contents need not be anxiously searched after so means of discovery are unimportant. Similarly, the order of ideas or conceptions in the mind is determined by natural principles so artificial patterns of organization are unnecessary. In fact, the universality of human nature implies that the order in which a speaker conceives a series of ideas is the order in which an auditor can most readily process the message. Mechanical schemes of organization reduce effectiveness by employing an "unnatural" order.

The second particular involves the rapidity with which Rhetoric became an object of opprobrium during the nineteenth century. Douglas Ehninger has frequently reminded us that "rhetoric is by nature a time and culture-bound phenomenon" which is "shaped by the intellectual and social environments" in which it exists. 48 By the close of the eighteenth century, theorists of the expressionist school had redefined Rhetoric and the newly discovered Rhetoric of expression remained viable only so long as the assumptions supporting it remained popular. The fate of Rhetoric during this era exactly parallels the fate of the constituents described above. During the nineteenth century, speculation concerning the mind-body problem came to be seen as a dead end--formally, a "pseudo problem" or "unresolvable anomaly"--and philosophers turned to more fertile fields. Theories of natural language faltered when observers were unable to identify universal expressions uninfluenced by culture, and the philosophic underpinnings of the doctrine were crushed by the weight of John Stuart Mill's attack on intuition and Common Sense in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865). Finally, the proliferation of faculties required to explain mental experiences brought faculty psychology into disrepute and moral sense theories were swept aside with the rest. "When one no longer finds a need for faculty psychology, the need to search for a moral faculty goes too," and subsequent philosophers have elected

to study the logic of moral judgements instead. 49 With the passing of the assumptions supporting it, the Rhetoric of expression ceased to be valued. Thomas DeQinicey's estimate of the accepted notion of Rhetoric during the third decade of the nineteenth century displays the consequences. The aim of expression, he said, was seen to be "something separate and accidental in the manner," so that the promises of Rhetoric are "impostures whenever its pretensions happened to be mighty, and of trifles whenever they happened to be true." 50

NOTES

1 An earleir version of this essay was presented at the second biennial congress of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1979). The author expresses his appreciation to Professor Paul Ried of Syracuse University whose thoughtful comments facilitated this expansion.

2 Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Ramus and English Rhetoric: 1574-1681," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 37 (1951), 299-310; and Logic and Rhetoric in England: 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 146-172.

3 The Advancement of Learning, II, xvi-xviii. A most helpful commentary on this point remains Karl R. Wallace, "Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, 3 (1936), 21-48.

4 Ephriam Chambers Cyclopaedia: or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1728) set the standard for several generations of encyclopedic works. He begins with a formal catalogue of knowledge following Baconian lines, but anticipates expressionist theory by dividing knowledge of human activities into internal arts such as Logic, and external arts. The external arts deal either with real objects as in Chemistry, or with symbolic objects. Symbolic objects include words, the object of Grammar; armories, the object of Heraldry; fables, the object of Poetry; and tropes and figures, the object of Rhetoric. [Cited from the 3rd edition; Dublin: Richard Gunne, et al, 1740, I, iii.] Chambers' work was in its third edition within twelve years, and other authors borrowed from it extensively. Composing the "Preliminary Discourse" to the Grand Encyclopedia, D'Alembert relied heavily upon Chambers, and D'Alembert's version was itself plagarized by Temple Henry Croker in his "Preface" to The Complete Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1764).

5 For Hobbes, absolute knowlede is the product of sense and memory while "science" is conditional knowledge displaying the consequences of what is known absolutely. Science is subdivided into Civil History and Natural History, and the latter is the ultimate genus of discourse. Several divisions of Natural History bring Hobbes to consequences from the qualities of men which include consequences from passions and from speech. Consequences from speech give rise to the arts of Poetry, Rhetoric, Logic, and Justice. See Leviathan, ed. Herbert W. Schnieder (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958), pp. 75-77.

6 Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1928), pp. 90 and 91.

7 For example, Sister Miriam Joseph argues that until recently Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric constituted a general theory of composition underlying all forms of discorse [Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), pp. 3-4 and passim]. Donald Lemon Clark shares this view. He argues that "the semantic content of the terms 'Grammar, Rhetoric, and Logic,' shifted a good deal from time to time over the centuries. They have always had a tendency to encroach on one another, to claim ever wider boundaries and to occupy spheres of influence at the expense of their sister arts. But like the warring city-states of ancient Greece or the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of the Heptarchy they were always aware of belonging to the same family. They are all arts of communication in language." [John Milton at St. Paul's School (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 5].

8 Three alternatives, the Liberal Arts pattern, a Baconian scheme, and the Fine Arts ordering, are described in my earlier essay, "Shifting Conceptions of Rhetoric in the Eighteenth Century" (Minneapolis; Speech Communication Association Convention, 1978).

9 See Appendix A for a partial list of eighteenth-century theorists who identified rhetoric as a fine art or art of expression.

10 To say that a theorist is committed to an expressive theory of art is to use the term in a more specific sense than the common notion of a word, phrase, or sentence being "an expression." A theorist committed to an expressive theory maintains that the principle function of the arts, "like poetry, [is] to express intellectual purposes, thoughts, conceptions, [and] sentiments that have their origin in the human mind." [Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "Poesy or Art," quoted in M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1958), p. 48.] This view is contrasted with mimetic theories maintaining that art is an imitation of natural phenomena and pragmatic theories defining art as a means of affecting an audience. In so far as rhetoricians have attended to aesthetic concepts, I believe pragmantic concerns have been paramount. However, assumptions current during the eighteenth century allowed theorists of the expressionist school to claim that pragmatic effects are a consequence of effective expression.

11 The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1958), p. 22.

12 P. 82.

13 Vincent M. Bevilacqua, "Philosophical Influences in the Development of English Rhetorical Theory: 1748 to 1783," Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society: Literary and Historical Section, XII (1968), 191-215, mentions the growing association between Rhetoric and Aesthetics. However, I believe he fails to appreciate the systematic character of the association. Professor Howell's fine histories, Logic and Rhetoric in England: 1500--1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956) and Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), focus on residual relationships between two of the arts of the Trivium and do not recognize emergence of the fine arts category. In the earlier volume, he notes the divergence of poetics--the theory of fictional composition--from its former sisters (p. 6). The growing association between Poetics and Painting has been observed by several scholars: William Guild Howard, "Ut Pictura Poesis," Publications of the Modern Language Association, XXIV (1909), 40-123; Cicely Davies, "Ut Pictura Poesis," Modern Language Review, XXX (1935), 159-169; and Rensselaer W. Lee, "Ut Pictura Poesis: The Humanistic Theory of Painting," The Art Bulletin, XXII (1940), 197-267.

Paul Oskar Kristeller's "The Modern System of the Arts," Journal of the History of Ideas, XII (1951), 496-527 and XIII (1952), 17-46 is a masterful survey but seldom attends to individual arts, especially to Rhetoric. The same limitation is true of other general histories of artistic classification with which I am familiar.

14 The qualification, "in print," is particularly important here because Thomas Reid developed a coherent expression theory of art which he articulated in his unpublished lectures at Glasgow throughout the 1770s. For description of his manuscript remains and examination of his aesthetic doctrines, see my articles, "Thomas Reid's Rhetorical Theory: A Manuscript Report," Communication Monographs, 45 (1978), 258-264, and "Thomas Reid's Fundamental Rules of Eloquence," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (1978), 400-408. Peter Kivy maintains that Reid was the only eighteenth-century theorist to entertain "something like the 'classical' expression theory," but his argument is unconvincing. Kivy's essay is "Thomas Reid and the Expression Theory of Art," The Monist, 61 (1978), 167-183.

15 For characteristic instances, see the etymology of "express" in the Oxford English Dictionary.

16 Useful accounts of this development include Rensselaer W. Lee, "Ut Pictura Poesis: The Humanistic Theory of Painting," The Art Bulletin, 22 (1940), 197-267, and Brewster Rogerson, "The Art of Painting the Passions," Journal of the History of Ideas, 14 (1953), 68-94.

17 The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 22.

18 Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, D. D., ed. Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1863), I, 274.

19 The Philospohical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldine and G. T. R. Ross, (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1931), I, 240.

20 Encyclopedia: Selections, trans. Nelly S. Hoyt and Thomas Cassirer (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 342.

21 Pleasures of the Imagination (1744) in The Poetical Works of Mark Akenside, ed. Alexander Dyce (London: N.P., 1834), p. 83.

22 Spectator, no. 411 (1712), in The Works of Jospeh Addison, ed. George Washington Green (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincot & Co., 1883), VI, 324.

23 Birkwood Ms. 2131.7 (I) (12).

24 Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting, and Music, trans. Thomas Nugent (London: John Nourse, 1748), I, 337.

25 The Art of Speaking, p. 29.

26 A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism ed. Vincent M. Bevilacqua and Richard Murphy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), p. 77. Alexander Gerard's thoughts parallel Priestley's; see An Essay on Taste, ed. Walter J. Hipple, Jr. (Gainesville: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1963), pp. 48-49.

27 The Advancement of Learning in The Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (London: Longman and Co., 1859), III, 368.

28 "The Passions of the Soul," in Descartes: Philosophical Writings, ed. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: The Modern Library, 1958), p. 265.

29 The Conference of Monsieur LeBrun (London: John Smith, 1701), p. 7

30 The Art of Speaking, p. 13

31 Elements of Criticism (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid & J. Bell, 1762), II, 119-120.

32 The Art of Speaking, p. 12.

33 Quoted in Isabel F. Knight, The Geometric Spirit: The Abbe' de Condillac and the French Enlightenment (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 155-56n.

34 Elements of Criticism, II, 145.

35 The quoted passages are from Works, I, 122 and II, 665.

36 Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music, trans. Thomas Nugent (London: John Nourse, 1748), I, 323.

37 "Point of View in Rhetorical Situations: Classical and Romantic Contrasts and Contemporary Implications," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (1979), 175.

38 An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), in Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson, prepared by Bernasrd Fabian (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971), I, 237.

39 The principle texts have been collected by L. A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897). Useful commentaries include James Bonar, Moral Sense (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930), D. Daiches Raphael, The Moral Sense (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), and David Pate Norton, From Moral Sense to Common Sense: An Essay on the Development of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy, 1700-1765 (Diss. University of California at San Diego 1966).

40 A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 547n.

41 Discourse, ed. G. P. Mohrmann (Los Angeles: Augustan Reprint Society, 1969), p. 17. Sheridan is here quoting from his own British Education (1756).

42 "The Language of Nature and Elocutionary Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LII (1966), 116-124.

43 Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (London: W. Strahan, 1783), II, 192. For a general account of the importance of description in eighteenth-century theories, see Gerard A. Hauser, "Empiricism, Description, and the New Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 4 (1972), 24-44.

44 The Philosophy of Rhetoric ed. Lloyd Bitzer (Carbondale: Southern Illincis University Press, 1963), p. 90.

45 "Of Eloquence," in Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 69

46 Birkwood Ms. 2131.5 N.

47 James Burgh, The Art of Speaking, p. 29.

48 "The Promise of Rhetoric," H TEXNH, eds. Richard Leo Enos and William E. Wiethoff (Falls Church, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1978), p. 2.

49 Elmer Sprague, "Moral Sense," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), V, 387.

50 Selected Essays on Rhetoric, ed. Frederick Burwick (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), pp. 82 and 81.

APPENDIX A

(1) Charles Perrault	Le Cabinet des Beaux Arts (1695)
(2) Jean Baptiste DuBos	Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting, and Music (trans. 1748)
(3) Anonymous	The Polite Arts (1749)
(4) Edmund Burke	A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime And Beautiful (1756)
(5) Alexander Gerard	An Essay on Taste (1759)
(6) James Burgh	The Art of Speaking (1761)
(7) Henry Home, Lord Kames	Elements of Criticism(1762)
(8) Thomas Reid	Unpublished lectures on the Fine Arts (1764-1780)
(9) William Cockin	The Art of Delivering Written Language (1775)
(10) Anselm Bayly	The Alliance of Music, Poetry, and Oratory (1789)
(11) Immanuel Kant	Critique of Judgment (1790)

(1) Eloquence, Poetry, Music, Architecture, Painting, Sculpture, Perspective, and Mechanics. Of these, the first three are "set to one side" because they deal with 'purely spiritual matters and are expressed by the spoken word and by the voice."

(2) Eloquence and Declaration are compared to Poetry, Painting, and Music.

(3) Poetry, Painting, Music, Architecture, and Eloquence.

(4) No explicit list of the fine arts, but draws examples from Music, Painting, Architecture, Gardening, Poetry, and Eloquence.

(5) Music, Painting, Statuary, Architecture, Poetry, and Eloquence.

(6) Eloquence, Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, Music, and "the other elegancies."

(7) Lists only Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, Gardening, and Architecture, but makes frequent references to Eloquence.

(8) Eloquence, Music, Painting, Sculpture, Gardening, Architecture, Landscaping, Poetry, and Acting.

(9) Speaking and Reading are compared to Music; "Polite Speaking" is an art of improving nature classified with Music, Dancing, and Gardening.

(10) Criticizes the accepted union of Music, Poetry, and Painting, and argues that Music, Poetry, and Oratory are the true sister arts.

(11) Arts of Speech including Rhetoric and Poetry; Formative Arts such as Sculpture, Architecture, and Painting; Arts of Sensory Modulation consisting of Music and the Art of Color; and Combined Arts containing Theater, Song, Opera, and Dance.